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Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family with
the evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper provides
a new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introduc-
ing eﬀort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect information
of the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First, I solve
and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfect infor-
mation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of
the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive to the income vari-
ations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results
of the analysis suggest that imperfect information accounts for many of the
patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J14, H20.
Keywords: Altruism, intergenerational transfers, private information.
∗Aﬃliation: Universitat Pompeu Fabra. I thank Joe Altonji, Marco Bassetto, Tullio Jappelli
and Raman Uppal for very helpful discussions. This work has been funded by the Bank of Spain
andby a Dissertation Year Fellowship from Northwestern University. All errors are mine.1. Introduction
The altruism model of the family posits that the utility of an individual (for
example, a parent) depends on the utility of other family members (for example,
an adult child), and that this interdependence shapes intergenerational transfers
of money and services. Richer parents, if altruistic towards their adult children,
will be more likely to give transfers to poorer children. In fact, Becker (1974)
and Barro’s (1974) altruism models imply that an exogenous redistribution of
the income of a dynasty linked by altruism and providing monetary help will
be neutralized by private intergenerational transfers. Assessing empirically if
altruism is the force behind economic links is then crucial for understanding the
eﬀectiveness of any public program that redistributes income between generations.
This paper assesses if the altruism model of the family can be reconciled with the
empirical evidence on intergenerational transfers in the US.
Several papers have tested Becker’s hypothesis with data from the US. Their
results generally conﬁrm that, while the response of transfers to the income of the
parent and the child have the predicted sign, the responses are almost an order of
magnitude less than what is needed to support the hypothesis that transfers neu-
tralize redistributions of income between generations. While the altruism model
of family links predicts that, among parents giving transfers, a dollar increase in
the income of the parent coupled with a dollar decrease of the income of the child
results in a rise of the intergenerational transfer of one dollar, empirical estimates
show that transfers increase by less than 15 cents.1
Alternative explanations have been given for this ﬁnding. Pollak (1988) argues
that transfers from altruistic parents are tied to speciﬁc assets, and do not respond
to the income variations of the child. Andreoni (1989) suggests that parents
are not altruistic, but derive utility from the mere action of giving transfers.
Kotlikoﬀ et al. (1990) ﬁnd that children may beneﬁt from acting strategically to
exact higher parental transfers from their altruistic parents. Cox (1987) argues
that parents use transfers to buy services from their children. McGarry (2000)
assumes that parents are uncertain about the future earnings of their children and
use current earnings as a signal of permanent earnings. All these explanations
overturn Becker’s prediction.
This paper assesses whether adding two key modiﬁcations to the basic altruism
1See for instance, Altonji et al. (1997) andMcGarry andSchoeni (1995) who use matched
d ata on parents andchild ren andﬁndthat red istributing a d ollar of income from the childto
the parent rises transfers by less than 15 cents. Cox (1987) andCox andJakubson (1995) use
d atasets on receivers of help only, andﬁndthat parental transfers respondpositively to the
income of the child. Their results imply that redistributing a dollar of income from the child to
the parent rises parental transfers only by 1 cent.
2model improves the concordance between the model and the data. I endogenize
eﬀort of children and relax the assumption that the parent has perfect information
about the labor-market opportunities of the child. I consider that incorporating
children’s labor supply decisions in the altruism model is very important, given
t h ef a c tt h a ts e v e r a lr e s e a r c h e r sh a v ed o c u m e n t e dt h a tc h i l d r e nm o d i f yt h e i rl a b o r
market decisions because of parental help.2
In my model parents observe the income of their (egoistic) children, but ob-
serve neither the labor market opportunities nor the eﬀort of their children. For
example, parents visit their children, and can infer their income from their con-
sumption habits. Nevertheless, it is hard for them to observe whether children
have the option of working in a lucrative job that requires extended hours. In this
setting, parents face a trade-oﬀ when deciding about the optimal amount of help
to give to their descendents. On one hand, they would like to compensate the
income variations of their children. On the other, the monetary help may distort
the eﬀort decisions of their children. I show that parents solve this trade-oﬀ by
providing transfers that do not respond much to income.
I also show that, under some circumstances, the strategic considerations just
mentioned are important for children who have a weak attachment to the la-
bor market, but not for those who are very attached to the labor market. In
particular, I show that if altruistic parents act according to my model, parental
transfers are more responsive to the earnings of children with lower labor sup-
ply elasticities. I then develop an empirically testable hypothesis by referring to
the well-documented fact that labor supply elasticities diﬀer across the various
members of a married child’s household. I test whether or not parental transfers
are more responsive to a fall in the labor earnings of the member of the child’s
household with a lower labor supply elasticity - the primary earner.3
While previous researchers have modeled the eﬀects of imperfect information
about labor market opportunities on the size of parental transfers,4 Ia mn o t
a w a r eo fw o r kt h a ta t t e m p t st om a t c ht h ee m p i r i c a lf a c t sa b o u tt r a n s f e r so rt o
make an empirical test of the theory. This paper makes two contributions to this
literature. The ﬁrst contribution is to assess the quantitative impact of imperfect
information on the response of parental transfers of money to income to the
2CardandLemieux (2000) d ocument that younger generations in US andCanad a have
reactedto ad verse labor market cond itions by staying longer at their parent’s house. Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1993) also present evidence that the receipt of an inheritance disincentivates labor
market participation.
3This result is vey close in spirit to previous results in the literature of optimal taxation.
For example, Boskin andSheshinski (1983) argue that marginal taxes shouldbe higher for the
income earnedby primary earners than for the income earnedby second ary earners.
4See, for example, Kotlikoﬀ andRazin (1988) andChami (1998).
3parent and child. I do this assessment by simulating a computable version of the
altruistic model under imperfect information. My simulation results suggest that
imperfect information greatly reduces the optimal responses of parental transfers
to earnings of the child and to earnings of the parent.
The second contribution is to extend the model so that it yields testable em-
pirical predictions. I present empirical evidence from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (wave 1988). While not all the predictions of the theory are accepted,
I ﬁnd evidence that the probability of receiving a transfer responds more to per-
manent earnings of the primary earner than to those of the secondary earner in
the household of a married child.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 provides a benchmark case in which the parent has perfect information about
the labor market opportunities of the child. Section 4 solves the model with
imperfect information. Section 5 provides simulation results. Section 6 discusses
the empirical strategy and the data used. Section 7 presents the results of the
empirical test and the paper concludes with Section 8.
2. The model
This section describes the households of the parent and child and provides the
modeling assumptions.
Two households interact in this model. The ﬁrst one is the household of a
single parent who cares about the utility of the child. The second household is
that of the child, and is composed of two members: a primary and a secondary
earner. Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 describe the preferences of the members of these
two households. Assumptions 4 and 5 describe the information of the parent
about the labor market opportunities and eﬀort of the child.
The household of the child maximizes the joint utility function of the two
members. Their utility depends on the consumption of a common good (cc),
the hours of leisure of the primary earner (lc
p) and the hours of leisure of the
secondary earner (lc
s). For each member of the household of the child, leisure is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between time available (l
c
s for the secondary earner, l
c
p
for the primary earner) and hours of work (hc
p for the primary earner, hc
s for the
secondary earner).5
5The following notation is used. The superscript p (c) over a variable denotes that it cor-
respond s to the parent (child ). Subscripts will only be usedfor the householdof the child .
The subscript p denotes primary earner, and the subscript s denotes secondary earner (in the
householdof the child ).
4Assumption 1 (preferences in the household of the child): The joint utility of










where v(),γs(), and γp() are increasing, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable
functions. Furthermore, γ￿￿￿
s () is assumed to be positive.
Assumption 2 (labor supply elasticities): The labor supply of the primary
earner is perfectly inelastic with respect to own wage. The (uncompensated)
elasticity of the labor supply of the secondary earner with respect to own wage is
positive.
There is abundant evidence that the elasticity of hours worked with respect
to own wage is higher for married females (secondary earners) than for married
males (primary earners).6 The assumption of a zero elasticity of labor supply for
the primary earner simpliﬁes considerably the theoretical setup of the problem. It
has been used in previous empirical studies of incentives-see Attanasio and Davis
(1996).7







Income of the primary earner is the product of the wage wc
p, and the (ﬁxed)
number of hours worked by the primary earner (h
c
p). Income of the secondary
earner is the product of the wage wc
s and the number of hours worked (hc
s).
Consumption is less than or equal to the sum of the income earned by the two












6See, for example, Johnson andPencavel (1984). Characterizing husband s as primar y earners,
as opposedto wives may seem anachronistic. Nevertheless, almost all husband s in my sample
have higher permanent incomes than their wives. Also, while there is an important literature
showing that the uncompensatedlabor supply elasticity to own wage is larger for marriedfemales
than for marriedmales, I have not foundevid ence about the labor supply of primary and
secondary earners (regardless of their gender).
7An alternative interpretation is that the householdmakes a choice between the number of
hours that each member of the householdof the childspend s working in the market sector and
the number of hours devoted to home production. Assumption 2 then can be restated as: “only
the secondary earner is productive at home.”
5That is, total earned income of the household is the sum of income earned
by the secondary and primary earners. The rationale for this division is the
following: the ﬁrst component will be aﬀected by eﬀort decisions, and is sensitive
to the wage of the secondary earner, in the sense that a change in the labor
market opportunities of that earner also changes the optimal level of hours of
market work. The second component is assumed to be strictly exogenous. There
is no labor supply response of the primary earner to a wage change.
Assumption 3 (altruistic parent): The preferences of the parent are deﬁned
over own consumption and the utility of the household of the child. They can be
represented by the function:







where cp stands for consumption of the parent. Namely, cp is the diﬀerence
between income of the parent ( yp) and the money given to the child through
monetary transfers t. η is a parameter measuring the degree of altruism of the
parent.8
Assumption 4 (variables that the parent does not observe): The parent does
not have information about the wage realizations nor about the eﬀort decisions
of any of the members of the household.
Ex ante, the parent knows that the wage of each earner is drawn from a
discrete distribution with n wage values (0 <w c
p,1 <. . .<w c
p,n) for the primary
earner and another distribution of n wage values (0 <w c
s,1 <. . .<w c
s,n).f o rt h e
secondary earner. Each wage wc
p,i and wc
s,i(wages of the primary and secondary
earner respectively) is drawn with probability πc
p,i (for the primary earner) and
πc
s,i for the secondary earner.9
Assumption 5 (variables that the parent does observe): The parent observes
the income earned by each member of the household: namely, the product of the
wage and the number of hours worked. The parent is able to distinguish between
t h ei n c o m ee a r n e db yt h ep r i m a r ya n ds e c o n d a r ye a r n e r .
Assumption 4 formalizes the notion that it is diﬃcult for parents to observe
the marginal rate of pay of an extra hour of work of their children. Parents, in
general, may not know whether or not their children search for overtime work. It
i sa l s od i ﬃ c u l tt oo b s e r v ew h e t h e ro rn o tt h ec h i l dh a st h eo p p o r t u n i t yo fw o r k i n g
in less pleasant but more lucrative occupations.
8The assumption of risk neutrality imposes that parental transfers are not aﬀectedby income
of the parent. In the simulations, I relax this assumption.
9Modelling the wage distribution as continuous is arguably more elegant. Nevertheless, I
couldnot get clean results for the preferences posedin this paper.
6On the other hand, it is possible to observe the earnings of the persons within
a family. Parents visit their children, observe the home they live in, whether they
have a car, and their consumption habits. Hence, they can form an assessment of
what is the total income earned in the household of the child. Assumption 5 goes
further, and states that the parent can observe the earnings of each member. The
idea is that parents know the education and occupation of each of the members
of the household of the child. Up to some observational error, parents can infer
the earnings of each of the members.10
An additional note about the consequences of assumptions 3 and 5 is in order.
I assumed that the primary earner always desires to work the same number of
hours. I also assume that the parent knows the preferences of the household
of the child. The parent is not aware of the wage of the primary earner, but
observes the income earned (assumption 5), and knows what are the preferences
of the primary earner for work. Hence, the parent is able to infer the origin of
any income variation of the primary earner. Thus, this component can be treated
as observable.
Finally, I brieﬂy describe the allocation of consumption and leisure consumed


























i=1. For the preferences assumed in the simulations, both consumption and
labor income earned by the secondary earner are increasing with respect the
wage wc
s, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. This completes the
description of the model.
3. The case with perfect information
This section solves the problem for the case in which the parent has perfect
information about the wages and choices of each one of the two members of the
household of the child. This will establish a benchmark to compare the eﬀects of
private information on the shape of parental transfers.
10One may argue that parents can observe the wage of the child, as well as the number of
hours worked, but not the preferences for leisure of the children. The model can be reinterpreted







c as the preference of the childfor leisure. Child ren with higher w
c ﬁndit less
costly in terms of utility to achieve an earnings level y
c. If the parent is not able to observe w
c,
but do observe earnings, the results of my model would still hold.
7The parent decides over own consumption and over the consumption and
labor choices of the two members of the household of the child. This plan is
made before the child is born. The parent does not need to worry about the
disincentives created by parental help, as the wage of each member is perfectly
observed. Nevertheless, the parent cannot enforce a plan that involves negative
transfers from the household of the child.
The parent maximizes the expected utility function over all the possible wages
of the secondary earner. The utility of the altruistic parent depends on the level






















exo +ti ∀i =1 ,...,n
where
Uc











s,i is the probability of occurrence of the wage wc
s,i, yp denotes
parental resources, ti the amount of parental monetary transfers, Uc is the level
of utility of the child, η is the altruism parameter, cc
i denotes the consumption
of the child, wc
s,i is a particular realization of the wage of the secondary earner,
yc
s,i is the earnings of the secondary earner in the household of the child, and yc
exo
is the earnings of the primary earner in the household of the child. The parent
solves (3.1) for each level of yc
exo.
The subscript i indexes the diﬀerent wages that the child could earn. In this
expression, for convenience, the number of hours worked by the secondary earner
is replaced by the ratio of the labor earnings and wage of the secondary earner.
Also, the wage of the primary earner is normalized to one. The solution of this
problem assigns a diﬀerent transfer (or combination of consumption and income
in the household of the child) for each possible wage and level of income of the
primary earner.























=0 ∀i =1 ,...,n (3.3)
Equation (3.3) equates the marginal disutility of an additional hour of work of
the secondary earner in the household of the child, weighted by the wage, to the
marginal utility that the child derives from an additional unit of consumption.
For an isoelastic utility of the child, equation (3.3) implies that the income earned
by the secondary earner is increasing with the wage.
Equation (3.2) states that the parent equates the (constant) marginal utility
of own consumption with the marginal utility that the parent derives from one
unit of extra consumption of the child. Given the shape of the utility function
of the child, equation (3.2) implies that for all wages of the secondary earner
that cause a positive transfer, the consumption in the household of the child is
a constant. That is, the parent guarantees a constant consumption level to the
child. Also, given that income is increasing with the wage, the marginal utility of
consumption of the child decreases with the wage of the secondary earner. Hence,
given yc
exo, there is a wage wc
s,v0 for which the marginal utility of the parent is
greater than that of the child, and the parent stops providing transfers.
The prediction of constant consumption for children who receive transfers is
an extreme case of the oﬀsetting of exogenous redistribution of income predicted
by the altruism model by Becker (1974). The assumption of risk neutrality of the
altruistic parent changes the prediction of oﬀsetting of exogenous redistribution
to a perfect compensation of income variations of any of the members of the
household of the child.11
Figure 1illustrates the perfect information allocation of child’s household
consumption and income of the secondary earner with a full solid line (for a
given level of income of the primary earner yc
exo) . F o ra l lw a g e st h a tp r o m p ta
parental transfer, the parent provides the household of the child with a constant
level of consumption. This level exceeds the sum of the earnings of the primary





With linear utility in consumption of the parent, this equality still holds, but in a more






9and secondary earner (the dotted line in Figure 1) by the amount of parental
monetary transfers. For higher wages, there is no transfer, and the child lives
on own resources. Given that the child has the same level of consumption for
the range of wages that prompt a transfer, and that the income of the secondary
earner increases with the wage, parental transfers decrease with income on a
dollar for dollar basis.12
3.1. The transfer decision.
So far, I have only discussed the determinants of the transfer amount. In this
subsection, I discuss the determinants of providing a transfer under perfect infor-
mation.
















exo,η) is the level of earnings of the secondary earner that
solves equations (3.1) and (3.2). In the equilibrium under full information, for
each wage of the secondary earner wc
s the parent provides a transfer if and only if
L(wc
s,yc
exo,η) is positive. In that case, the marginal utility that the parent derives
from an additional unit of own consumption is smaller than the utility that the
parent derives from an additional unit of consumption of the child, when transfers
equal zero.
Regarding the eﬀects on the latent variable of a change in the earnings of the
primary and secondary earner, a dollar increase in the earnings of the primary
earner has two eﬀects on the latent variable. First, it diminishes the marginal
utility that the parent derives from the consumption of the child, and makes the
transfer less likely. There is a second order eﬀect, because the earnings of the pri-
mary earner also aﬀects negatively the earnings of the primary earner, and tends
to increase the marginal utility that the parent derives from the consumption of
the child. The overall eﬀect is likely to be negative if the second order eﬀect is
small. On the other hand, an increase in the earnings of the secondary earner
will have a negative eﬀect on the likelihood of a transfer, as the marginal utility
that the parent gets from the consumption of the child.
12In this model, both the earnings of the secondary earner and the transfers level are decisions
of the parent. This section andthe next subsection d escribe the optimal relationship between
transfers and earnings of the secondary earner, where the diﬀerent levels of earnings of the
second ary earner in the householdof the childcorrespondto d iﬀerent wages w
c
s,i.
10Summarizing, the expanded model of altruism under perfect information has
sharp empirical predictions regarding the response of the transfer amount to the
earnings of both members of the household of the child. It predicts a dollar
for dollar substitution of income of the child with parental transfers, no matter
whether these variations occur because of an increase in the income of the primary
or the secondary earner. Also, if we ignore the second order eﬀect, this model
predicts similar responses to the probability of receiving a transfer to earnings
variation of the primary and secondary earner.
4. Second best solution: the case with imperfect information
The purpose of this section is to provide a full characterization of intergenera-
tional transfers under imperfect information. Speciﬁcally, the main objectives are
ﬁrst, to determine the optimal response of parental transfers to earnings of both
members of the household of the child and, second, to assess whether or not the
parental transfers compensate more for variations in the earnings of the primary
earner in the household of the child than for variations in the earnings of the
secondary earner.
The section has three subsections. In the ﬁrst one, the nature of the solution
of the problem is discussed and it is proven why the perfect information allocation
is not feasible under imperfect information. In the second, the solution to the
problem with imperfect information is characterized. In the third subsection, I
examine the response of parental transfers to income variations. I am able to
prove that parental transfers are more sensitive to the earnings of the primary
earner in a special case. For all other cases, evidence based on simulations is
presented.13
4.1. Overview
With imperfect information, the parent makes a monetary transfer conditional
on every possible income realization of each of the earners. The child chooses
a point of transfers and income in the schedule given by the parent. A parent
who observes that the secondary earner has a low income level cannot distinguish
w h e t h e rt h er e a s o nf o rt h i si st h a tt h i ss e c o n d a r ye a r n e rh a dap o o rd r a wo f
wc
s or if the secondary earner had a high wage draw but decided to exert low
eﬀort. Hence, a parent who is unable to observe the true wage of the secondary
13I am aware that simulations do not provide me with a formal proof of the result. Neverthe-
less, the theory of optimal contracts and insurance provides scant closed-form results. A notable
exception to this literature is Ligon (1998).
11earner must take into account that the child may act strategically. The parent
must provide the correct incentives so that, in the event that the child has a
high wage, it is not optimal for him or her to choose a point in the transfer
schedule in which the secondary earner exerts low eﬀort and the household lives
oﬀ parental transfers. I give a graphical explanation of why a transfer schedule
with the features of the perfect information case does not provide the child with
the correct incentives.
Figure 1depicts the preferences of the child between consumption and income.
These depend on the wage observed by the child. Consumption is a “good” for
the household of the child, and income is a “bad” (earning more income implies
enjoying less leisure). Figure 1reports two indiﬀerence curves. The steeper one
corresponds to the case in which the secondary earner has a low wage. The less
steeper corresponds to the case in which the secondary earner has a high wage.
The slope of the indiﬀerence curve is steeper if the child has a low wage because
of the following reason. Earning an extra dollar is costlier in terms of eﬀort for
a child with a low wage. If the child is to earn an additional unit of income, it
takes more consumption to maintain a child with a low wage in the same utility
level than to keep indiﬀerent a child with a high wage.
If the parent presented the child with a “ﬂat” budget constraint -the ﬁrst
best allocation- there would be a range of wages for which the optimal choice
for the child is to have the secondary earner in the household work zero hours,
and live oﬀ parental transfers (Figure 1). This allocation is not optimal for the
parent. Under imperfect information, the ﬁrst-best plan incentives the child to
lie about the wage of the secondary earner. It turns out that the optimal shape
of the program is that presented in Figure 2, where income and consumption are
weakly increasing in the wage, and parental transfers are less responsive to the
earnings of the secondary earner than in the solution of the case with perfect
information.14
14The setup of this problem presupposes that the parent is able to precommit to maintain
the transfer in the schedule once income is realized. The imperfect information solution is a
secondbest solution, so both the parent andthe childcan beneﬁt by mod ifying the transfer,
once the parent observes the earnings of the child. One alternative to this model is that the child
“moves ﬁrst” andchooses the favorite earnings level. In such a case, the parent wouldoptimally
choose to compensate all income variations, andthe spouse wouldchoose not to work. Even if
the parent is risk averse, Ricard ian equivalence wouldholdamong household s giving transfers
in this case. As I d iscussedin the introd uction, this result is not supportedby the d ata on US
transfers.
124.2. The setup.
Under imperfect information, the interaction of the parent and the child can be
modelled as a Bayesian game. The action of the parent is the amount of the
monetary transfer. The action of the child is an eﬀort level, and the type of
the child is the wage of the secondary earner, that the parent cannot observe.
I assume that the parent knows the distribution from which the wage of the
secondary earner is drawn. As stated in assumption 4, the parent observes neither
the eﬀort choices nor the wage of the secondary earner. Hence, the parent has to
provide the child with a transfer plan that does not provide work disincentives.
The transfer plan will be a budget constraint linking the consumption and income
of the secondary earner, from which the child chooses a point.
The Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1991) suggests that this class of games
can be reinterpreted as another game with the following timing and strategies. In
the ﬁrst stage, the child privately observes the wage, and reports it to the parent.
In a second stage, the parent gives the child a recommended labor supply and
consumption decision -these two variables determine the transfer that the child
will receive. Third, the child exerts the eﬀort, and attains the income. Finally, in
the fourth stage, the parent observes the income realization, and transfers occur.
The parent has to establish a plan so that the child ﬁnds it optimal to report the
true wage, instead of pretending that another wage occurred.
The next step is to characterize the solution of this game. It belongs to
the class of principal-agent models (P-A), where the parent acts as an altruistic
principal making a contract with a selﬁsh agent. I assume that the parent solves
the problem for every possible realization of yc
exo. The parent has now the same
preferences as in the case with perfect information. Nevertheless, the parent
faces constraints on the amount of consumption granted to the child. The parent
cannot oﬀer the child schemes that induce the child to lie about the wage of the

































∀i =1 ...n ∀j =1 ...n,i ￿= j (IC)
13s.t. ti ≥ 0 ∀i =1 ...n
where
Uc










(IC) stands for incentive compatibility constraints. They embody the restric-
tion that the child must be prevented from lying about the observed wage. The
solution of this problem assigns to each wage a consumption and an income level,
just as in the benchmark case with perfect information. Transfers can be recov-
ered from this bundle, as the diﬀerence between consumption and the sum of
income of the primary and secondary earners.
I characterize the solution of the problem in the next proposition.





i=1} of the parent is
characterized as follows. The transfer schedule presents the following character-
istics:
[1] consumption and earnings of the secondary earner are increasing in the
wage, up to a ﬁnite number of bunching points.
The consumption-earnings schedule contains three regimes.





[3] There is an intermediate range of wages for which the child receives zero
transfers and is indiﬀerent between the chosen bundle and the one associated to
the lower wage.





exo, for wages higher than
this, transfers are also zero.
The proof of the proposition is detailed in Appendix 1.
Hence, the optimal transfer schedule has the following characteristics. If the
wage of the secondary earner is low enough, the parent will provide transfers
and have the secondary earner producing only in the nonmarket sector. There is
an intermediary range of wages for which consumption in the household of the
child rises. Finally, for a given level of yc
exo i ft h ew a g eo ft h es e c o n d a r ye a r n e r
is high enough, the child will not receive any transfer at all. For a more precise
characterization of the schedule, I need to analyze the response to transfers to
income of the child. This is done in the next subsection.
144.3. The response of the transfer amount to variations in income
In this section, I present three propositions, which characterize how parents re-
spond to variations in the two components of the total income in the household
of the child.
First, I characterize the response of transfers to income of the secondary
earner. Because the grid of wages is discrete, a derivative of transfers with respect
to income earned by the secondary earner is not well deﬁned. The problem will be
addressed using a concept from the literature on optimal taxation: the “implicit
marginal tax.”15



















which is, one minus the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and earnings evaluated at each point of the solution (see previous footnote). The
slope of the transfer schedule is the IMT multiplied by minus one.16
Proposition 2. The implicit marginal tax on eﬀort income (income of the sec-
ondary earner) is a (positive) number strictly smaller than one.
15This magnitude reﬂects the trade-oﬀ between consuming an additional unit and exerting
the eﬀort necessary to earn an additional unit of income. This trade-oﬀ depends on the wage
privately observedby the child . See, for example, Besley andCoate (1995).
16The rationale of the deﬁnition is the following. Assume for a moment that the distribution
of wages is continuous. Assume also that a diﬀerentiable scheme t(y
c) exists, andthat this






























































In the simulations in the next section I conﬁrm that as the wage distribution is populated
with more wages andbecomes closer to a continuum, the ”implicit marginal tax” converges to
the actual slope of the transfer function, measured as the ratio of increment in transfers divided
by the increment in income.
150 <IMT(yc
s,i) < 1 ∀i =1 ,..,n
This proposition formalizes the intuition in Figure 2. That is, despite the fact
that consumption and income are increasing in the wage, parental transfers will
decrease with the wage of the child. Parental transfers will be weakly redistribu-
tive, in the sense that parents will give more to the child if the income of the
child is lower.
This is an important result, as it shows that it is possible to have an altru-
ism model in which risk neutral parents do not compensate children for income
variations, if the assumption of perfect information is relaxed.
Proposition 3. If the transfer scheme is such that, in equilibrium, the child
receives a transfer for every wage, a variation in income that does not involve an





= −1 if t∗
i > 0 ∀wc
s,i
Proposition 4. If the transfer scheme is such that, in equilibrium, there is a
range of wages for which the child receives transfers and another for which the
child does not, a variation in income that does not involve an eﬀort response will






< 0 if t∗
i =0 f o rs o m ew c
s,i
Hence, the last two results suggest that, if in equilibrium transfers are positive
for all wages, the reaction of transfers to observable shocks is greater in absolute
value than the response to eﬀort income (where the latter is driven by unobserv-
able wage diﬀerences that prompt an eﬀort response). This is not necessarily the
case if in equilibrium there are wages for which transfers are zero.
In order to get an intuition for the ﬁrst proposition, consider Figure 3. This
ﬁgure depicts an equilibrium in which the child receives a positive parental trans-
fer for every possible wage. Imagine also that the income of the primary earner
in the household of the child falls by a dollar. This amounts to a parallel shift
of the budget constraint in the absence of transfers to the southeast. The parent
will choose to keep the same consumption-income schedule for the child as before
the fall in the income of the primary earner. The reason is that this schedule
satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraints. In the new equilibrium, parental
16transfers (the vertical distance between the budget constraint in the absence of
transfers and the consumption level) compensate the fall in income of the primary
earner on a dollar for dollar basis.
Consider now the equilibrium in which there is some level of income yc
v for
which parental transfers are zero, and the consumption in the household of the
child is the sum of earnings of the primary and secondary earners. This allocation
is depicted as A in Figure 4. Consider the income level yc
v. For this income level
yc
v, the child is indiﬀerent between reporting the true wage of the secondary earner
(wc
v) and pretending that the secondary earner received a wage wc
v−1 and receiving
positive transfers. Assume now that the income of the primary earner falls by a
dollar. The budget constraint of the child, in the absence of transfers (the dotted
line in Figure 4) has a parallel shift to the southeast. The allocation that the child
with wage wc
v can aﬀord moves now to a point like B. Assume that the parent
kept the same consumption-income schedule. That would imply that the parent
replaces the fall in earnings of the primary earner with transfers at a dollar for
dollar basis for all wages below wc
v. In that case, the child with wage wc
v has an
incentive to pretend that the wage of the secondary earner is wc
v−1 and receive
positive parental transfers, in a point like C. The child has no incentive to report
the true wage wc
v. Hence, in this case, it is not feasible for the parent to substitute
earnings of the primary earner with transfers on a dollar for dollar basis without
creating an incentive for the child to lie.
In order to give support to the hypothesis that transfers react more to vari-
ations in the income of the primary earner, section 5 presents evidence from
simulations, conﬁrming the intuition.
4.4. The transfer decision
Finally, I discuss the determinants of providing a transfer under imperfect in-
formation. Due to incentive problems, the parent will not provide a transfer
comparing the marginal utility of own consumption with the marginal utility of
consumption of the child. In the next section, I compute the reaction of the
probability of receiving a transfer to both earnings components solving the model
numerically.
Before going to the simulations, I summarize the main diﬀerences between
the patterns of the transfer schedule under perfect and imperfect information.
There are two main diﬀerences. The ﬁrst is that, in the imperfect information
case, transfers do not diminish with earnings on a dollar for dollar basis. Second,
under imperfect information, parental transfers treat diﬀerently the earnings of
diﬀerent members of the household.
17How would one apply this model to the data? Consider a sample of households
with information on parental transfers and earnings of the household of the child.
For each household, one can observe the combination of transfers and income
selected by the child from the budget constraint set by the parent. Hence, one
can then use the variation in wages across households to estimate the reaction of
parental transfers to the income of the recipient child.
5. Simulations
This section solves the altruism model of the family numerically to obtain further
insights about the eﬀects of imperfect information on the schedule of transfers
and earnings.
5.1. Transfer amount
In the section above, it was proven that, if in the solution, the child receives
a monetary transfer no matter what the wage realization is, the response of
parental transfers to exogenous income components is bigger than the response
to labor income components. The result was not proven for the important case in
which there is a range of wages that do not qualify for a transfer. Furthermore,
the qualitative results do not provide information about the magnitudes of the
transfers responses to the various components of income. This section provides
evidence about the response of transfers to earnings of children from simulations
based on plausible parameters for the utility function.
Following much of the literature on labor supply and consumption, the fol-

















and, for the parent:
Up = εcp +ηUc
Simulations of the model require estimates of the parameters of the utility
function, the shape of the wage distribution that the child faces ex-ante, and some
estimate of the earnings of the primary earner. Parameters of the utility function
are chosen in the following manner. φc is the degree of risk aversion of the child.
A higher value of φc is associated to a more concave utility function (with respect
to consumption). An estimate of 2 is used, following Rangazas (1999). ρs is taken
to generate an uncompensated labor supply elasticity of married women that falls
18within the range of empirical estimates of Mroz (1987). Namely, a baseline value
of 2.4 is chosen, for ρs. This value generates a static labor supply elasticity of
0.13 evaluated at the mean wage in his sample, 11 dollars (1993 dollars).
The parameter η and the marginal utility that the parent derives from own
consumption (ε) are not separately identiﬁed inthe model, due to the fact that the
parent is risk neutral with respect to own consumption. ε is normalized to 1, and
η picked so that the simulated average transfer matches the unconditional mean
of transfers in the PSID 1988 transfer ﬁle, 378 dollars per household (including
values of zero).
The wage distribution was obtained from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics. The wage of a wife is deﬁned as the ratio of labor earnings over hours of work
reported. The mean wage of a white married secondary earner with 30 years of
age and no kids is predicted by means of a log regression of wages on demograph-
ics and year dummies. The mean residual for each individual over the years that
the individual contributed an observation is then added to the mean predicted
value. The 10th percentile, mean and 90th percentile of the resulting distribution
of the wages are 4.97, 10.8, and 17.9 (1993 dollars). In order to get estimates of
the probability of a given wage, the density of the distribution is estimated using
ak e r n e l .
To obtain yc
exo I regressed labor earnings of primary earners on a set of de-
mographics and year dummies. This regression yields the prediction of mean
earnings of a white primary earner at age 30 without children. The mean value
of the prediction is 27,000 dollars (valued in 1993 dollars).
Speciﬁc details of the simulation procedure can be found in Appendix 2. The
baseline speciﬁcation takes φc as 2 and ρs as 2.4 (which implies an uncompensated
labor supply elasticity of the secondary earner of 0.44, 0.11 and 0 at the 10th
percentile, mean and 90th percentile of the wage distribution).
Table 1reports the simulated mean response of parental transfers to variations
in income of the secondary earner for the two information regimes: perfect and
imperfect information. In both information regimes, the response of parental
transfers to income variations is negative, but the magnitude of the response is
very diﬀerent in each case. While under perfect information a dollar increase in
the income of the primary earner is associated to a dollar decrease in parental
transfers (rows 4 and 5), the same dollar increase under imperfect information
decreases parental transfers by only 12 cents (row 9, speciﬁcation I). The mean
response of parental transfers to income of the primary earner is 20 cents in
absolute value (row 10, speciﬁcation I).
The second result to note is that the average response of parental transfers to
income variations of the secondary earner is smaller in absolute value than the
19response of parental transfers to the income of the primary earner.17 Finally, it is
worth noting that, compared to actual data, the simulated model under imperfect
information overpredicts the proportion of households receiving transfers, (54
percent vs 23 percent) and underpredicts the mean of parental transfers for those
who receive ( these results are not reported in the Table 1).
Table 1presents a second speciﬁcation where ρs is 3, which corresponds to
an uncompensated static labor supply elasticity of 0.11 at the 10th percentile
of the wage, 0 at the median wage and -0.05 at the 90th percentile of the wage
distribution. This value of the coeﬃcient ρs implies that the disutility of leisure
is now less closer to linear than in the former speciﬁcation. Drawing an analogy
from the results of the optimal taxation theory, parental transfers should be
especially responsive to income of a secondary earner with a low static labor
supply elasticity, because this secondary earner is very attached to the labor
market. The simulations in Table 1conﬁrm this intuition. The average response
of parental transfer to income of the secondary earner is slightly higher in absolute
terms than in the baseline case: a dollar increase in the permanent income of
the wife decreases parental transfers by 13 cents (row 9, speciﬁcation II). The
response of parental transfers to variations in the income of the primary earner
are now smaller in absolute value: an increase in the income of the primary earner
diminishes parental transfers by 18 cents (row 10, speciﬁcation II).
The simulations above assume that the parent is assumed to be risk neutral
in own consumption. To assess if this assumption is driving the results in Table
1, a third set of simulations is ran (speciﬁcation 3). Parental preferences are now





A value of 2 is chosen for φp, consistent with the choice for φc.T h et h i r dp a n e l
in Table 1presents the results of these simulations. Again, imperfect information
about the wage of the children reduces the magnitude of the responses of transfers
to earnings of the primary and secondary earner in the household of the child.
The numerical results are similar to the case in which parental utility is linear on
own consumption, and I do not comment them in detail.
17The response of parental transfers to variations in income of the primary earner is pointwise
higher in absolute value than the response of transfers to income of the secondary earner.
205.2. The transfer decision
The previous analysis has focused on the response of the transfer amount to the
earnings of the husband and wife among households that receive transfers. This
subsection investigates numerically the relationship between the probability of
receiving a transfer and the earnings of both members of the household of the
child.
The strategy I use is the following: I generate a random sample of 530 house-
holds of children from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, each with a diﬀerent
realization of the wage of the secondary earner, wc
s, earnings of the primary earner,
yc
exo. The mean (standard deviation) of yc
exo is 27,000 dollars (10,222). The cor-
responding numbers for the wages of the secondary earner wc
s are 9.95 (4.16). I
assigned to each household a random parameter of parental altruism η, drawn
from a Normal distribution with an average of 14.18. Given that I could not ﬁnd
in the literature an estimate for the variance of η, I use several parameter values.
Each household is assumed to have the same preferences used in the previous
subsection, and faces the same ex-ante distribution of the wage of the secondary
earner (the distribution of wages described in the previous subsection). To evalu-
ate the impact of imperfect information, I ﬁrst assume that the parent can observe
the wage of the secondary earner, and then relax the assumption. The output
of these computations is a sample of children in which the i-th observation is a
transfer amount ti(wi,yc
i,exo,η i), and the earnings choice of the secondary earner
yc
i,s(wi,yc
i,exo,ηi). I examine the response of the probability of receiving a transfer
to the earnings of the husband and wife using the following Probit.
P(ti > 0|yc
i,exo,yc
i,s)=Φ ( γ0 +γ1yc
i,exo + γ2yc
i,s)
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution, ti is the amount of parental trans-
fers received by the child, and yc
i,exo and yc
i,s reﬂect the earnings of the husband
and wife in the household of the child. The results of the simulations are shown
in Table 2.
In the ﬁrst and second rows of Table 2, I report the coeﬃcient on the Probit of
earnings of the primary and secondary earner in a sample generated under the as-
sumption that the parent has perfect information about ws. For all speciﬁcations,
the coeﬃcients of both earnings components are almost identical, consistent with
the discussion in Section 3.1.
18Variation in η is needed in order to identify the eﬀects of earnings on the probability of
receiving a transfer. As shown in Section 5, the probability of receiving a transfer is zero
if earnings fall below the cutoﬀ value of earnings. Hence, without variation in the altruism
parameter η, the earnings of the secondary earner would be a perfect predictor of receiving a
transfer.
21The third and fourth rows in Table 2 present the coeﬃcients of the same Probit
speciﬁcation on a sample generated assuming that the parent does not have full
information on the wage of the secondary earner. In this case, the probability
of receiving a transfer does depend on which member of the household loses the
dollar. An increase in the earnings of the primary earner has a bigger impact
on the probability of transfer receipt than the same increase in the earnings of
the secondary earner. These results are on line with those found in the previous
subsection: under imperfect information parental transfers are more responsive
to the earnings of children who are more attached to the labor market.
The second panel in Table 2 presents the predicted probability of receiving
a transfer at various income levels. At the sample means, the probability of
receiving a transfer is 0.26. A household in which the secondary earner earns
$4,000 less than the average has a probability of receiving of 0.38. Conversely, if
the primary earner earns $4,000 less than the average, the probability that the
household receives a transfer is 0.54.
5.3. Results from the simulations
Overall, I draw three conclusions from the simulations. The ﬁrst conclusion is
that imperfect information reduces substantially the sensitivity of the amount of
parental transfers to the income of the parent and child, and helps reconciling
the predictions of the altruism model of the family with the data. The second
conclusion is that, according to the altruism model of the family under imperfect
information, the amount of parental transfers is more responsive to the income
of the primary earner than to the income of the secondary earner. Finally, the
third conclusion is that the probability of receiving a transfer is more responsive
to the income of the primary earner than to the income of the secondary earner.
I test the last two hypothesis in the next Section, using data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics.
6. The empirical strategy and the sample
This section motivates the econometric speciﬁcation of the model and discusses
the data. In the empirical implementation, I examine whether data drawn from
the PSID supports the pattern of simulation results described in section 5. First,
I examine whether a dollar increase in the earnings of the primary earner has a
bigger impact on the probability of receiving a transfer than the a dollar increase
in the earnings of the secondary earner. Second, I test whether a dollar increase
in the income of the primary earner in the household of the child leads to a larger
22reduction in the parental transfer amount than a dollar increase in the income of
the secondary earner in the same household.
I use a limited dependent variable model to compare the slopes of the transfer
function with respect to income of the primary and secondary earners in the
household of the child. In the data, the primary earner is identiﬁed with the
husband in a married household, and the secondary earner with the wife.
The model estimated is the following:




i +δXi + Ui,0} (6.1)
The dependent variable (Ti) is the amount of transfers received by the house-
hold of the child, indexed by i. Y c
h,i are a measure of permanent labor earnings of
the husband in the household of the child, and Y c
f,i labor earnings of the wife in
the household of the child. βh and βf are the degree to which the transfer from
the parent decreases with income of each of the earners. Y
p
i stands for permanent
income of the parent. The results from Section 5 imply that parental income af-
fects positively the amount of the transfer. The income measure to include in the
equation deserves discussion. The model described in section 4 is static. In this
framework, both parental transfers and income of the child are lifetime decisions.
Following Altonji et al. (1997), I construct lifetime earnings variables.
Xi includes variables that control for the determinants of the needs of the
m e m b e r so ft h eh o u s e h o l do ft h ec h i l ds u c ha st h et o t a ln u m b e ro fc h i l d r e ni n
the household of the child -grandsons and granddaughters of the parent- and the
speciﬁc number of children in age brackets. Xi also includes variables that aﬀect
the willingness of the parent to provide a transfer, including whether parents are
divorced or widow/er, and interactions with marital status. Finally, Xi includes
determinants of the earning ability of the child, such as education. It is quite
likely that parents use all available information to form an assessment of the
wage distribution faced by their children. Education is a variable that parents
can easily observe, and it is also a strong predictor of earnings. Hence, parents are
likely to use that information to make a better assessment of the wage distribution
faced by the members of the household of the child.
The transfer function can only take positive values, because the parent cannot
enforce negative transfers. Also, the sample of children receiving transfers is a
selected one, as households composed of children with high incomes who receive
transfers will tend to have parens who are very altruistic. This implies that a
limited dependent variable model should be used. The empirical test that I make
i sw h e t h e ro rn o t|βh| ≥| βf|.
A standard speciﬁcation, like the Tobit, presents the following problem. Unob-
servable variables summarized by Ui are constrained to enter the transfer equation
23in a separable fashion. Nevertheless, it is easy to show than, even in the most
simple perfect information case, the reaction of transfers to income of the child
depends on household-speciﬁc parameters such as parental altruism. That is,
transfers depend on income and unobservable taste parameters in a non sepa-
rable way. Hence, the coeﬃcients of the Tobit speciﬁcation may be biased, and
nothing can be said a priori on the direction of the bias.
This problem motivates the second estimation strategy, which is based on a
semiparametric estimator developed by Altonji and Ichimura (1997). I refer to
this estimator as the A-I estimator. Unlike the Tobit speciﬁcation, this estimator
reports the mean slope of the transfer schedule, but allows for heterogeneity in
these slopes. It provides an estimate of E{
∂Ti(Yi,Ui)
∂Yi |Yi,T(Yi,U i) > 0},w h i c h
is the expected value of the response of transfers to an extra dollar of income
when income is Yi evaluated over the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity Ui
conditional on a positive transfer. In the special case in which the Tobit model
is correctly speciﬁed, this is the coeﬃcient in the Tobit model.19 Finally, I report
estimates using a two step approach to correct for sample selection
6.0.1. Endogeneity of Child’s Income
The estimators I use take Y c
f,i as ﬁxed when the parent chooses Ti. In the model
solved above, parents choose both earnings of children and transfers. In other
words, both variables are chosen simultaneously. Nevertheless, I have chosen
to run regression models to match the moment computed in the simulations in
Section 5. In that section, I report the slope of the locus of transfers and earnings
of the secondary earner -the equivalent to a regression function.
There is a further issue, not taken into consideration in the previous litera-
ture on transfers. Comparing the transfer-income selection of diﬀerent households
can be problematic, as there is heterogeneity in the degree of parental altruism.
Holding education constant, more generous parents are likely to give higher trans-
fers and allow the secondary earner to earn less income, hence biasing downward




|Yi,T(Yi,U i) > 0} =
∂E{Ti|Yi,T(Yi,U i) > 0}
∂Yi
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I implement it by replacing the expressions on the right handsid e with estimates obtainedusing
a global polynomial approximation to the regression function E{T(Yi,U i)|Yi,T(Yi,U i) > 0} and
the conditional probability P{T(Yi,U i) > 0|Yi}. Standard errors are calculated using the delta
method-see Altonji at al (1997).
24the coeﬃcient on income of the secondary earner in a censored regression model.
While this problem may be addressed instrumenting labor earnings with the wage
of the secondary earner, I do not do this in this paper. The reason is that the per-
formance of the instrumental variables version of the A-I estimator may be poor
with a sample size like the one at hand. At any rate, the presence of heterogene-
ity in parental altruism will bias the coeﬃcient on the income of the secondary
earner against the predictions of the altruistic model of the family under imperfect
information.
6.1. Data
This subsection presents the data on transfers and the construction of the per-
manent income measures.
6.1.1. The sample
The data is taken from the 1988 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
which includes a supplement of transfers between relatives. This survey contains
reliable data on lifetime resources of the recipient of transfers and detailed in-
formation on transfers. The sample consists of married respondents to the 1988
survey who were between 21and 55 years of age in this year. In 1 988, in addition
to the transfer supplement respondents were asked questions about their parents
and their spouse´s. Questions include education, age, marital status, and current
income. This sample has been used by other researchers. Among their ﬁndings,
it is worth mentioning that transfers do not seem to be related to the purchase
of a house by the child -see Altonji et al (1997). They also report that very few
children are students, so transfers are not likely to be associated to payments like
college tuition.
6.1.2. Data on transfers.
The Transfer supplement contains information on the amount received and on
the person who gave the transfer. The question asked is: “During 1987, did
(you/your family living there) receive any loans, gifts or support worth $100 or
more from your parents? About how much were those loans, gifts or support
worth altogether in 1987?”
Separate questions are asked about transfers from the father and transfers
from the mother if the parents are divorced. The question is asked ﬁrst about
the husband’s parents and then about the wife’s parents. I aggregate transfers
25from both sets of parents. That speciﬁcation implicitly assumes that both sets of
parents coordinate when deciding about giving transfers to their children.
6.1.3. Data on the permanent income of the child
The measure of permanent income of the child is a time-average of past, current,
and future income adjusted for demographic variables and time. I used the panel
data on all individuals from the PSID who were either a head or a wife in a
particular year. The following income generating process is assumed:
logYit = γ0 + Zitγ1 + eit +vi (6.2)
Yit are labor earnings of the member in the household of the child in a given
year. Zit contains a set of demographic variables. vi is a permanent individual
eﬀect, uncorrelated with the demographic variables, and eit denotes transitory
v a r i a t i o ni ni n c o m e .
The parameters γ1 are estimated by (gender speciﬁc) OLS regressions, using
all the individuals in the PSID who were ever heads or wives between the ages
of 18 and 60 (and only years in which they were heads or wives).20 Also, only
years in which labor earnings were above 400 dollars are included. The individual
speciﬁc component vi is estimated as the mean of the residuals for each person.
This component is added to the predicted income for a person of age 40, married,
and without children, and the variables are normed so that Zitγ1 is 0 for such a
person. Consequently,
￿ Y c
i =e x p ( γ0 +vi)
A caveat with this measure of lifetime resources is that secondary earners tend
to participate in the labor market less frequently than primary earners do. Hence,
including only the years in which wives earn more than 400 dollars is likely to
overestimate their true lifetime resources. To correct for this, lifetime resources
of the individuals are weighted by the proportion of years that they contributed
to the regression, i.e.:
Y c
i =




The 10th percentile, median and 90th percentile of the resulting distribution
of permanent earnings of the husband are 14,926, 33,271 and 57,147, respectively
20The Zit contains a fourth order polynomial in age centered at the age of 40, a dummy for
non married, number of children and year speciﬁc dummies. For females, dummies indicating
headof householdandheadof householdwith child ren are also ad d ed .
26(dollars of 1993). For wives, the corresponding numbers are 6,264, 16,225 and
34,187.
Finally, these income measures are pre-tax. Nevertheless, parents decide on
transfers based on their income and the income of their children after taxes. Even
in the presence of perfect information, this will bias the test against altruism. I
do not correct income to make it net of taxes. I suspect that it will not aﬀect
the prediction of diﬀerent reaction of transfers to income of the primary and
secondary earners if they ﬁle jointly their income taxes.21
The sample consists of observations on 2,022 household with information on
earnings and transfers received. Table 3 shows the (unweighted) summary statis-
tics of the sample. 23% of all married households report transfers from at least
one set of parents. The mean transfer (among those who receive) is 2,986 dollars
(in 1993). The mean age of the children is 35 years (for husbands) and 33 (for
wives). Nonwhites are overrepresented in the sample, as they contribute a 22%
of the observations.22
7. Results
This section analyzes the eﬀects of permanent income of each member in the
household of the child on both the amount of the transfer received and on the
probability of receiving a transfer. I provide evidence based on Probit, Tobit,
Heckman two step and A-I estimators.
7.1. The response of parental transfers amount to earnings of husband
and wife
In what follows, I censor transfers above 10,000 dollars and give them a value
of 10,000. The main reason that I censor the data is to reduce the inﬂuence of
outliers on the estimates. However, transfers above 10,000 dollars can be subject
21This sample has no direct information on parental permanent income. I create a measure
of this variable by exploiting the special structure of the PSID. A subsample of respondents
in the 1988 survey were born inside PSID households. I match the records of persons who
were sons/daughters in the 1968 PSID sample to the records of their parents. I then construct
measures of the lifetime resources of the parents of these respondents following Altonji et al
(1997). For the rest of respondents in the 1988 survey, I impute parental income by means
of predicted values of regressions of parental lifetime resources on the set of parental variables
available in the 1988 survey.
22Given the choice of households of children, the sample includes cases coming from the same
family. That is, there are 23 observations of individuals whose children are also included in the
sample. I reran the analysis excluding these cases, without much eﬀect on the results.
27to taxes, and the prediction of Becker (1974) will not hold for them.23
7.1.1. Probit analysis
In this section, I use a Probit speciﬁcation to test if the probability of receiving
a transfers reacts more to a dollar decrease in the earnings of the primary earner
than to a dollar decrease in the earnings of the secondary earner.
The Probit models I and II in Table 4 include the receipt of a transfer as
the dependent variable. All models include a polynomial in the age of the head
and wife and variables that reﬂect the composition of the household, in order to
capture the needs of the child that aﬀect the marginal utility of consumption of
the household.24 A sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n6 ,t h ee d u c a t i o no ft h eh u s b a n da n d
the wife are also included in some speciﬁcations. Standard errors are corrected
for the fact that regressors are generated, along the lines of Cox and Jakubson
(1995). They also correct for the fact that respondents may come from the same
1968 household.
In all speciﬁcations, the sign of the earnings of the husband is negative. The
coeﬃcient of the earnings of the wife is also negative, and the magnitude is sig-
niﬁcantly lower than that of the husband. The coeﬃcients in the Probit model I
imply that an increase of 10,000 dollars of the income of the husband increases
the probability of receiving a transfer by 0.025. An increase of 10,000 dollars of
the income of the wife increases the probability of receiving a transfer by 0.014.
These results accord with the predictions of the altruistic model of the family un-
der imperfect information. Including education of the child and quadratic terms
in earnings rises the absolute value of impact of earnings on the probability, for
both members of the household of the child. This change in coeﬃcients can be
interpreted as an indication that parents use education to assess the wage distri-
23Individual transfers of less than 10,000 dollars to a given individual are not subject to taxes
in the US, while these above $10,000 are included in the donor’s gift tax base. Once the donor
accumulates $600,000 dollars of taxable gifts (above $10,000), gifts are taxed. Married couples
can give 20,000 a year up to a 1.2 million limit, assuming a careful estate management. More
details in Poterba (2001).
24The set of demographics includes contains the following variables: a polynomial of second
ord er in the age of the husbandandwife in the householdof the child , d ummies ind icating
whether the parents of the husbandandwife are wid ow or a wid ower, andinteractions with
marital status, d ummies for d ivorcedparents, andinteractions with the marital status anda
dummy for nonwhite child. I also include the total number of children (grandchildren of the
parent) living in the household of the child. Finally, the number of children of the child between
1 and2 andthe number of child ren of the childbetween 3 and5 years of age are includ ed .
28bution faced by the members of the household of the child
7.1.2. Tobit speciﬁcation
This subsection presents the results of the Tobit speciﬁcation. The Tobit model
I in Table 4 shows that parental transfers rise by 2.2 cents in response to a dollar
reduction in the earnings of the head. Transfers rise by 1cent in response to a
dollar decrease in the income of the secondary earner.25 This result accords with
the results from the simulations in section 5. The diﬀerence in slopes is robust to
the inclusion of education of the parent and child (Tobit model II in Table 4). As
in the Probit analysis, both income coeﬃcients become larger in absolute value
when the education of both members is included.
The predicted sign of education is ambiguous. On one hand, schooling is an
observable component of income, and the parent should “tax” it. In this case,
the sign of the coeﬃcient should be negative. On the other hand, as mentioned
above, education of the child can be correlated with parental altruism. Parents
with a higher degree of altruism are likely to give more gifts to their children
than less altruistic parents. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for both members of the household. Finally, the rest of the
coeﬃcients are in line with the Probit results.
The evidence from the Tobit speciﬁcation is consistent with the hypothesis
under consideration: a dollar decrease in the permanent earnings of the head
results in an increase in transfers that ranges from 2.2 to 3.6 cents. Conversely,
a dollar decrease of the permanent earnings of the wife results in an increase of
transfers between 1and 2.4 cents. Nevertheless, the Tobit model constrains the
slope of the transfer amount to be the same as the determinants of the proba-
bility of reporting a transfer. Hence, the coeﬃcients of the Probit part may be
driving the results concerning the slope of the transfer schedule. In the previous
subsection, it was seen that a dollar decrease in the income of the head is more
likely to be associated with the reporting of a parental transfer. To evaluate to
what extent is the Probit part of the likelihood function aﬀecting the results, I use
three estimators that use the subsample of children receiving positive transfers.
7.1.3. Heckman two step estimator
To circumvent the speciﬁcation problem in the Tobit model, a two step estimator
is presented in table 5. That table shows the results for linear speciﬁcations in
income that do not control for selection (OLS) and who do control for it (2 step
25The reportedstand arderrors in the Tobit speciﬁcation d o not account for correlation within
the family nor for the fact that parental permanent earnings are generated.
29Heckman). Only the subsample of 546 children households who receive transfers
is used.
The OLS coeﬃcients are most probably biased, as they do not take into ac-
count the truncation in the dependent variable. The income coeﬃcients in the
OLS model I are negative and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero: a dollar de-
crease in the income of the husband results in a decrease of 0.5 cents in transfers.
The eﬀect of income of the wife is slightly smaller in absolute terms (0.4 cents),
and not statistically signiﬁcant. The reported standard errors account for corre-
lation within dynasties and heteroscedasticity between dynasties, as well as for
generated regressors.
Including a term that takes sample selection into account results in higher
standard errors.26 OLS-corrected model I reports a speciﬁcation without educa-
tion measures, and the coeﬃcients of income of the husband and wife are positive
and nonsigniﬁcant, contrary to the prediction of the altruism model of the fam-
ily. The results do not vary much once the education of the child and parent
are included. Nevertheless, the standard errors are very high, and none of the
coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This experiment is not conclusive,
due to the imprecision of the estimates. I turn next to the A-I estimator.
7.1.4. A-I estimator
Table 6 presents the results from the estimator developed by Altonji and Ichimura
(1997). As mentioned above, this estimator has the advantage of allowing for
heterogeneity in the preferences of the parents and the child, as well as nonsepa-
rability between the error terms and the explanatory variables.
The parameter reported is the derivative of transfers with respect to perma-
nent earnings of the husband and wife for the subsample of children who report
transfers, evaluated at sample means. To estimate the form of the truncated re-
gression, a global polynomial procedure was used. It contains the income of the
parent, a third order polynomial in labor income earned by the wife in the house-
hold of the child, and third order polynomial in labor income earned by the head,
and interactions between ﬁrst order and second order terms of the polynomials.
The same set of demographics as in the former speciﬁcations is included.
Evaluated at mean earnings, an extra dollar of permanent income of the hus-
band results in a decrease of parental transfers of 2 cents. The average reaction
of transfers to earnings of the wife varies more across speciﬁcations. In model I,
that excludes education controls, it is 3 cents. Once the education of the members
26In their analysis of intervivos transfers, Cox andJakubson (1995) report accuracy problems
when using a generalizedTobit estimator.
30of the household of the child is included (models II and III), the average slope of
the income of the wife rises to 5 cents. These results contradict the prediction of
the model of altruism under imperfect information regarding the response of the
transfer amount to the earnings of the members of the household.
7.2. Discussion of ﬁndings
Overall, the conclusion of the analysis with permanent earnings of husband and
wife supports one of the predictions of the altruism model under imperfect in-
formation: the probability of receiving is higher if the primary earner of the
household of the child loses a dollar than if the secondary earner does. Another
prediction of this model is that among households who receive transfers, an ad-
ditional dollar of the primary earner diminish transfers more than an additional
dollar of the secondary earner. Only the Tobit coeﬃcients are consistent with
that hypothesis, but the pattern can be explained by the speciﬁc functional form
restrictions that this model embodies. Once nonseparabilities and measurement
error issues are taken into consideration, the evidence does not support this sec-
ond prediction.
A possible explanation for this failure of the theory is that parents care more
about their own oﬀspring than about their son or daughter in-law. This fact could
create heterogeneous responses to earnings components if, in addition, children
households are not unitary. I explored this possibility examining the response
of the transfer amount to the earnings of the donor, controlling by the sum of
earnings of both members of the household. If parents are only altruistic toward
their own oﬀspring, their transfers should be very responsive to the earnings of
the oﬀspring. The results of the A-I estimator in Table 7 show that, controlling
for the resources of the household of the child, a loss of a dollar in the income of
the oﬀspring of the donor does not increase the transfer amount signiﬁcantly.
A model with exchange-motivated parental transfers could be consistent with
the failure of the prediction of informationally constrained altruism regarding the
transfer amount. For example, imagine that parents provide transfers to their
young children in exchange of care when the parents are older. Parents would
then be more likely to compensate with transfers the income variations of their
daughters as they are more likely to provide help when parents grow old.
Further evidence in support of the altruism model under imperfect informa-
tion can be found in Villanueva (2001). In that paper, I present evidence based
on food consumption data, following the same strategy as Altonji et al (1992),
who use dynasty ﬁxed eﬀects models of consumption growth in a given year.
They ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in consumption growth among parents and siblings
31are strongly related to diﬀerences in the growth of wages.27 Ie x a m i n ew h e t h e r
the diﬀerence in consumption levels of members of the same dynasty is related
to diﬀerences in observable shocks to income that lie outside of the control of
the child. The shocks considered are identiﬁed with unemployment due to plant
closings and medical conditions that limit the amount of work that can be done.
My ﬁndings are that none of these shocks are related to the diﬀerences in con-
sumption levels, nor do they explain the diﬀerence of growth rates between the
members of a dynasty. Nevertheless, the diﬀerences among the related house-
holds in wage growth do lead to diﬀerences in consumption growth. These results
indicate that the members of a dynasty are more willing to insure each other from
observable income shocks, than from variations in the price of labor or hour ﬂuc-
tuations that are not related to involuntary unemployment or health problems.
That interpretation is in line with the theoretical predictions of the present work.
8. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper asks whether the altruism model of the family can be modiﬁed to
reconcile it with the empirical evidence on intergenerational transfers. I expand
the altruism model of the family by including eﬀort of the child on one hand, and
by relaxing the assumption of parental perfect information about the labor market
opportunities of the child on the other. This new model is simulated, with some
parameters chosen to match estimates from the labor supply and consumption
literatures and others chosen to match the incidence of money transfer in the
U.S. The computations reported in the paper suggest that, among households
of children who are receiving monetary help, the response of parental transfers
to a dollar decrease in the income of the secondary earner in the household of a
married child is below 14 cents. Conversely, the response of parental transfers to a
dollar decrease of the income of the primary earner is around 22 cents. Previous
researchers have reported empirical estimates of the response of transfers to a
dollar decrease of the income of the child, and this magnitude is around 10 cents.
The paper also tests the following prediction of the model. Are parental
transfers more responsive to a dollar decrease in the earnings of the primary
earner in the household of the child than to a dollar decrease in the earnings of
the secondary earner? I do not ﬁnd that, among households receiving transfers, a
dollar decrease in the earnings of the primary earner rises transfers more than a
dollar decrease in the earnings of the secondary earner. Nevertheless, I ﬁnd that
the household of a married child is more likely to receive a transfer if the primary
earner loses a dollar than if the secondary earner does.
27See also the literature on risk sharing in the economy, particularly Cochrane (1991)
32What does this model say about the eﬀect of a program that taxes a dollar
of the income of the child to give it to the parent? This tax would lie out of the
control of the child, and would be observable to the parent. The model presented
in this paper predicts then that while parental transfers will not necessarily neu-
tralize this program, they will rise in response to it. The model presented here
also suggests that the increase of parental transfers following this exogenous re-
distribution will be higher than the increase suggested by Altonji et al. (1997)
or Cox (1987), who identify the eﬀect on parental transfers of income variations
of the child associated to endogenous eﬀort choices. The eﬀectiveness of public
programs that redistribute income between generations remains then an open
question for further empirical research.
9. Appendix 1: Proof of the propositions in the text.
This appendix presents the proofs of the propositions in the text. Proposition 1 is pre-
sented in a series of lemmas. The following notation is used. A hat (ˆ) over a variable
denotes that it forms part of the solution to the problem that the child would solve with-
out parental transfers. ￿ Uc(wj,yc
exo) is the utility level of the household of child if the
secondary earner has a wage wj in the absence of parental transfers. An asterisk (∗)
over a variable denotes that forms part of the solution to the problem with imperfect
information. Idrop the superscript c in the income and consumption variables of the
child. The utility function is rescaled to make zero the utility from the leisure of the
primary earner. The subscript s in the wage, probability and income is also dropped,
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33Besley and Coate (1995) prove that, for the preferences posed, one needs only to
worry about the informational constraints between adjacent wages. First Ideﬁne these
special informational constraints in detail.












wi ) will be
deﬁned as the downward adjacent incentive compatibility constraint (DAIC) associated
to wage wi












wi ) will be
deﬁned as the upward adjacent incentive compatibility constraint (UAIC) associated to
wage wi
Lemmas 1 through 7 characterize the solution described in Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. The participation constraint PC is never binding.









i) with (￿ ci, ￿ yi) -the optimal consumption level if the child does
not receive transfers. This change improves the utility of the child, if the wage of the
secondary earner is wi, and does not increase the cost to the parent, since the transfer
was at least nonnegative in the former solution, and now is zero. Once this change has















The reason is that, by revealed preference,
￿ Uc(wj,yc






Lemma 2. Any allocation {(ci,y i)i=n
i=1} satisfying the informational constraints im-
poses that consumption and income are nondecreasing in the wage.Also, if yi ￿= yi+1
then yi <y i+1



















































Using the facts that the marginal utility of leisure is higher for a person with a lower
wage, and that 1
wi > 1
wi+1 one gets that yi+1 ≥ yi Once income is nondecreasing in the
wage in equilibrium, consumption must also be nondecreasing in the wage. The second
part of the lemma follows from (9.4)
Corollary 3. Let the solution of the problem, {(c∗
i,y∗
i )i=n
i=1}.Let two bundles of con-









i+1).It cannot be the case that the UAIC associated to wage wi and
the DAIC associated to wage wi+1 bind at the same time.
The proof of this corollary is straightforward replacing the weak inequalities in the
proof of lemma 1 by equalities.
Lemma 4. If there exists a wage wr such that yr = 0 then, for every wage wi such
that wi <w r, y∗
i =0and c∗
i = c
Proof: from lemma 2.
Lemma 5. Let {(c∗
i,y∗
i )i=n
i=1} be the solution to the problem.For all j ∈ (1,...,n)
such that c∗
j >y ∗





j−1) the UAIC associated to wage wj−1 does not bind.
Proof: Assume that there is a range of (wn0,...,wn1) such that the UAIC for each
wage binds. Assume also that UAIC associated to wn0−1 does not bind, nor does the
one associated to wn1+1 (maybe because n0 = 1 and n1 = n). By assumption, there
exists at least two combinations of consumption and income that correspond to adjacent




k+1). By corollary 3, the










The set of inequalities (9.5) follows from the following facts: that (1) the consumption
level of any sequence that satisﬁes the adjacent incentive constraints is nondecreasing in
35the wage, and (2) the utility level is strictly concave in consumption. Also, at least one
of the inequalities holds with strict inequality.





i=n0} Assume that there are m wages that share the same combination
(c∗
n1,y ∗



















j+ε1 j = n0,...,n1−m − 1 (9.6)
This plan redistributes consumption from the wage types wn1...wn1−m to the wage
types wn0,...wn1−m−1, leaving the expected expenditure of the parent unaﬀected. It
does not violate the AIC constraints, for an ε small enough. The DAIC of wage n0 is re-
laxed. The UAIC between n1 and n1+1 will not bind for small enough ε. Finally, due to
strict concavity of v,increasing the consumption level of each wage type wn0,...w n1−m−1
by the same amount ε1 will not violate the UAIC between any two adjacent wages.28 It













28In equilibrium, before the modiﬁcation, the UAIC between any pair of adjacent wages
















Iwill show that increasing c∗
i and c∗





i+1) the new plan will not violate the UAIC associated to





















i+1 + ￿) −v(c∗
i+1)
Dividing by ￿ and taking limits, the last equality implies that the v￿￿ ≥ 0, which is not

























n1−m−1)]ε > 0 (9.7)
The ﬁrst inequality uses the fact that marginal utility of consumption is lower for
higher wages. The second equality substitutes in the deﬁnition of ε1. The increase is
positive, and we get to a contradiction. Hence, the UAIC will not bind for any interval.
Lemma 6. Let {(c∗
i,y∗
i)i=n







i−1) then the DAIC associated to wi must bind
Proof. Assume not. From corollary 5, Iknow that the UAI C associated to wage wi−1
does not bind. If the DAIC is non binding, the marginal utilities associated with higher
wages are strictly lower than those of the lower. One can then redistribute income in the
same manner than in the proof of lemma 5.
Lemma 7. Let the solution to the problem {(c∗
i,y∗
i )i=n
i=1}. If there exists some v ∈
(1,...,n) such that c∗
v = y∗
v +yexo, then, for all k>v ,
c∗
k= y∗
k +yexo and y∗
k=￿ yk
Proof: Assume that c∗
v = y∗
v + yexo and c∗
v+1 >y ∗
v+1 + yexo. Then, by the former
lemma, the DAIC constraint associated to wage wv+1 must bind. Using the IC’s, one
can get the following chain of inequalities:



















) =￿ Uc(wv+1,y exo)
The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that the utility for a given wage is, at least,
the level without transfers (lemma 1). The second equality makes use of the property that
the DAIC must bind, if transfers are positive. The strict inequality comes from revealed
preference. The chain of inequalities results in a contradiction, hence, c∗
v+1 = y∗
v+1+yexo.
Utility maximization implies that y∗
v = ￿ yv.
Lemmas 1 through 7 complete the proof of proposition 1.
The next step is to prove propositions 2 through 4 in Section 4. For the next proofs,
Iuse the result that, if the ﬁrst hour worked brings zero disutility to the child, then for
no wage is the child working zero hours in the solution.









) ∀i =1 ...n (9.9)




































) ∀i =2 ,...,v−1
s.t. ci≥ yi+yexo ∀i =1 ,...,n


































After rearranging, and dropping the income of the parent yp, the Lagrangian of this










































































































Proposition 8. If the solution is such that, in equilibrium, the child receives a parental
transfer regardless of the wage, an increase in yexo of a dollar rises ti by a dollar for every
i=1,..,v-1
Proof: This can be seen from the ﬁrst order conditions (9.11), (9.12) and (9.13). In




































The amount of transfers and yexo appears together in all expressions. This implies
that if yexo goes down by a dollar, then the transfer goes up by one.
Lemma 9. The implicit marginal tax on eﬀort income is a number between zero and
one.
From the ﬁrst order conditions (9.11), (9.12) and (9.13) and the fact that consumption
is nondecreasing with the wage.
3910. Appendix 2: Numerical solution
The optimal transfer scheme under perfect information is calculated from the ﬁrst order
conditions in Section 3, for the wage distribution and the parameter values of the utility
function described in Section 5.
The transfer scheme under imperfect information is derived using the results in Sec-
tion 4. First, the optimal allocation without transfers {(￿ yi)i=n
i=1} is computed. Using
proposition 1, it is known that, for wages of the secondary earner above the cut-oﬀ value
wv, the optimal transfer is zero, and the optimal income level is that without trans-
fers. Hence, the transfer scheme {(ci,y i(wi))i=n
i=v} for wages above a given wv is set to
{(￿ yi, ￿ yi)i=n
i=v}


























s.t. yi+1≥ yi ∀i = 1...v −1
















It can be shown that the objective function is concave in its arguments, and that
the constraints form a convex set if γ￿￿￿() is positive. The problem is solved for several
cut-oﬀ wages, starting with the wage cut-oﬀ under perfect information. The solution
is the {U1,(yi)i=v
i=1} combination that solves the former problem and the smallest wage
cut-oﬀ wv for which the Lagrange multiplier associated to the IC constraint is smaller
than the derivative of the utility of the parent with respect to ￿ Uv
The derivative of transfers with respect to yexo is obtained by solving the problem















40For the case of a risk averse parent, we could not get analytical results regarding
























s.t. yi+1≥ yi ∀i = 1...v −1
s.t. Ui≥￿ Ui ∀i =1 ...v −1
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43Table 1 Simulated eﬀects of earnings on the amount of the transfer.
Speciﬁcation I Speciﬁcation II Speciﬁcation III
φp = 0 φc =2 φp =0 φc =2 φc = φp =2
ρs =2 .4 η =1 4 ρs =3 η =1 4 ρs =2 .4 η =0 .35
Perfect information
1. Mean transfer 1,148 564 732
2. Income of wife 15,090 18,590 6,248
3. ∂t
∂yp 0 0 0.48
4.Mean ∂t
∂ys -1.00 -1.00 -0.52
5. Mean ∂T
∂yexo -1.00 -1.00 -0.49
Imperfect information
6. Mean transfer 343 186 375
7. Income of wife 14,920 18,490 8,042
8. ∂t
∂yp 0 0 0.17
9. Mean ∂t
∂ys -0.12 -0.14 -0.14
10. Mean ∂t
∂yexo -0.20 -0.18 -0.20
Actual data









The utility of the parent is Up = c
1−φp
1−φp For all speciﬁcations, l
c
s is set at 6 (corresponding
to a time endowment of 6,000 hours a year). The income of the primary earner is ﬁxed
at 2.7, corresponding to 27,000 dollars a year (the average earnings at age 30 of PSID
married males). The average response ∂t








The mean transfer corresponds to the unconditional mean reported by Altonji et al
(1997). Nevertheless, their sample also contains unmarried households. The empirical
estimates of the response of transfers to earnings of parents and children are taken from
Altonji et al. (1997), Cox and Jakubson (1995), and McGarry (1995).
44Table 2 Simulated eﬀects of earnings on the probability of a transfer.
Parameters in all speciﬁcations: E(η)=1 4 ,φ c = 2,ρ s =2 .4,φ p =0
Speciﬁcation I Speciﬁcation II Speciﬁcation III
V(η)=1 V (η)=2 V (η)=3
(A) Probit coeﬃcients,
Perfect information
1. Income, primary earner -1.09 -0.56 -0.31
(0.23) (0.10) (0.04)
2. Income, secondary earner -1.02 -0.56 -0.30
(0.26) (0.09) (0.04)
Imperfect information
3. Income, primary earner -0.55 -0.25 -0.19
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
4. Income, secondary earner -0.33 -0.15 -0.12
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
(B) Probability of transfer, imperfect information
5. Yh = Y h,Y f = Y f − 4 0.57 0.54 0.55
6. Yh = Y h,Y f = Y f 0.03 0.20 0.26
7. Yh = Y h,Y f = Y f +4 0 0.04 0.08
8. Yh = Y h,Y f = Y f − 4 0.24 0.38 0.47
9. Yh = Y h,Y f = Y f 0.03 0.20 0.26
10.Yh = Y h,Y f = Y f +4 0 0.11 0.08
Y h is $27,000, and Y f is $21,000. Magnitudes are in 1993 dollars.
45Table 3Descriptive statistics of selected variables
Total sample If No Transfer If Transfer
Variable (N=2,022) (N=1,476) (N=546)
Child received money 0.23 0 1
Amount received 807 0 2,986
Age of the husband 35.11 35.81 33.25
(7.14) (7.19) (6.67)
Age of the wife 32.96 33.59 31.24
(6.75) (6.73) (6.49)
Child’s income -husband 35,288 35,269 35,338
(17,967) (17.551) (19.062)
Child’s income -wife 18,586 18,459 18,930
(11,590) (11.520) (11.780)
Child´s education -husband 12.96 12.81 13.36
(2.59) (2.598) (2.531)
Child´s education -wife 12.83 12.68 13.25
(2.48) (2.43) (2.574)
Child´s race other than white 0.22 0.243 0.168
Age of father -husband 62.50 62.89 61.568
9.05 9.01 9.080
Age of father- wife 61.25 61.68 60.217
(8.76) (8.686) (8.856)
Parent´s income -husband 57,573 55,785 62,399
(24,197) (22,661) (27,372)
Parent´s income -wife 58,824 56,339 65.533
(25,528) (23,473) (29,382)
Father´s education -husband 10.89 10.671 11.424
(3.35) (3.31) (3.388)
Mother´s education-husband 11.09 10.75 11.587
(3.36) (3.34) (2.797)
Father´s education -wife 11.110 10.75 11.887
(2.869) (3.348) (3.279)
Mother´s education-wife 11.068 10.799 11.768
(2.942) (2.959) (2.779)
Divorced parents -husband 0.122 0.117 0.133
Divorced parents -wife 0.115 0.104 0.142
Parent is a widow -husband 0.286 0.306 0.234
Parent is a widow -wife 0.246 0.272 0.175
Standard deviations in parentheses. Monetary variables measured in dollars of 1993.
46Table 4 Reaction of transfers to permanent income: Probit and Tobit
Probit Model Tobit Model
Regressors Model I Model II Model I Model II
Earnings -child husband -.007 -.010 -.022 -.036
(.002) (.002) (.008) (.009)
Earnings -child wife -.003 -.006 -.010 -.024
(.003) (.004) (.012) (.015)
Earnings sq. -child husband excluded 8e-5 excluded .0002
(4e-5) (.0002)
Earnings sq. -child wife excluded .0001 excluded .0003
(.001) (.0005)
Earnings, parents of husband .006 .005 .036 .025
(.002) (.002) (.006) (.007)
Earnings, parents of wife .009 .007 .036 .025
(.004) (.003) (.006) (.006)
Education - child husband excluded .023 excluded .137
(.018) (.072)
Education - child wife excluded .042 excluded .220
(.019) (.081)
Education missing - husband excluded -.342 excluded -.208
(.389) (1.924)
Education missing - child wife excluded .2730 excluded .894
(.358) (1.406)
Education, father of husband excluded -.015 excluded -.134
(.014) (.057)
Education, mother of husband excluded -.001 excluded -.019
(.014) (.059)
Education, father of wife excluded .017 excluded .077
(.013) (.056)
Education, mother of wife excluded .005 excluded .027
(.015) (.060)
Age husband -child -.062 -.290
(.036) (.154)
Age husband, sq. -child -7e-4 -.300
(-7e-4) (.154)
Age wife -child .094 .330
(.041) (.181)
Age wife sq -child .002 .008
(7e-4) (.003)
47Table 4 Reaction of transfers to permanent income: Probit and Tobit (cont.)
Probit model Tobit model
Regressors Model I Model II Model I Model II
Father of husband widower .194 .849
(.170) (.678)
Mother of husband is a widow .044 .188
(.098) (.409)
Father of wife is a widower .084 .466
(.255) (.679)
Mother of wife is a widow -.202 -.609
(.099) (.414)
Father of husband widower, rem. -.1019 -.573
(.2397) (.989)
Mother of husband widow, rem. -.144 -.493
(.241) (.719)
Father of wife widower, rem. -.411 -1.824
(.255) (1.01)
Mother of wife widow, rem. .231 .426
(.170) (.752)
Parents of husband divorced .105 .504
(.161) (.659)
Parents of wife divorced .200 .356
(.156) (.649)
# Children, child hh. -.053 -.308
(.037) (.159)
# Children 1-2, child hh .072 .370
(.070) (.283)
# Children 3-5, child hh -.051 -.139
(.068) (.292)




Observations (positive) 2,022 (546)
Standard errors (in parentheses) account for correlation across observations involving
siblings and generated regressors in the Probit speciﬁcation. In the Tobit speciﬁcation,
standard errors are not corrected. All income variables are the deviations from sample
means. Unless otherwise stated, all models include the same set of controls, only shown
for Model II.
48Table 5 Reaction of transfers to permanent income.
Estimation method: OLS and selectivity corrected OLS
Dependent variable: Transfer Amount
OLS OLS corrected
Regressors Model I Model II Model I Model II
Earnings -child husband -.004 -.004 .016 .021
(.009) (.011) (.048) (.095)
Earnings -child wife -.004 -.005 .011 .009
(.015) (.0200) (.050) (.075)
Earnings sq. -child husband excluded 2e-5 excluded .0003
(.0003) (.001)
Earnings sq. -child wife excluded 4e-5 excluded -.0002
(.0004) (.002)
Earnings, parents of husband .016 .016 .001 .006
(.011) (.012) (.035) (.04)
Earnings, parents of wife .010 .010 -.005 -.002
(.010) (.011) (.039) (.049)
Education - child husband included .118 included .056
(.069) (.30)
Education - child wife included .1020 included -.004
(.0865) (.45)
Education missing -child husband 4.273 5.17
(3.626) (9.77)
Education missing - child wife -.330 -.88
(1.28) (4.58)
Education, father of husband excluded -.157 excluded -.13
(.076) (.201)
Education, mother of husband excluded -.055 excluded -.01
(.070) (.24)
Education, father of wife .027 -.053
(.061) (.184)
Education, mother of wife -.002 -.008
(.062) (.227)
Age head -child -.011 .016
(.051) (.847)
Age head, sq. -child -.002 .0002
(.003) (.014)
Age wife -child .007 -.278
(.043) (1.16)
Age wife sq -child -.002 -.006
(.003) (.024)
49Table 5 Reaction of transfers to permanent income (cont.)
Estimation method: OLS and selectivity corrected OLS
Dependent variable: transfer amount
OLS OLS corrected
Regressors Model I Model II Model I Model II
Father of husband widower .493 .138
(.655) 2.51
Mother of husband is a widow .133 .120
(.339) 1.349
Father of wife is a widower .548 .439
(.788) 2.322
Mother of wife is a widow .340 .777
(.550) 2.24
Father of husband widower, rem. -.412 -.217
(1.018) 3.603
Mother of husband widow, rem. -.253 .007
(.537) 2.87
Father of wife widower, rem. -.822 .032
(.913) 5.201
Mother of wife widow, rem. -1.094 -1.55
(.626) 3.154
Parents of husband divorced .242 .063
(.780) 1.92
Parents of wife divorced -.601 -1.082
(.559) 2.537
# Children, child hh. -.231 -.124
(.169) .788
# Children 1-2, child hh .154 -.007
(.296) 1.126
# Children 3-5, child hh -.021 .068
(.285) 1.09





Standard errors account for correlation across observations involving siblings and
generated regressors in the OLS speciﬁcation (not in the adjusted OLS speciﬁcation).
Income variables are the deviations from sample means. Transfers are censored.
50Table 6: Reaction of transfers to permanent income
Household-based sample
Dependent variable: transfer amount.
Estimation method: A-I estimator.
Derivative evaluated at sample means
Regressor Model I Model II Model III
Income of child - husband -.023 -.027 -.032
(.013) (.013) (.013)
Income of child - wife -.035 -.048 -.048
(.022) (.022) (.023)
Other controls
Education - child husband excluded included included
Education -child wife excluded included included
Education -parents. excluded excluded included
Observations 546
Standard errors in parentheses. They allow for arbitrary correlation between observa-
tions belonging to the same dynasty, and are obtained using the delta method. Transfers
above 10,000 dollars (in 1993 dollars) are censored and set at 10,000. All models include
the same regressors included in Tables 3-5. The sample mean of permanent earnings of
the primary earner is $35,288. The corresponding number for the secondary earner is
$18,586
51Table 7: Reaction of transfers to permanent income
Child-based sample
Dependent variable: transfer amount.
Estimation method: A-I estimator.
Derivative at sample means
Regressor Model I Model II Model III
Earnings, both children -.012 -.018 -.018
(.010) (.012) (.012)
Earnings, child of donor -.002 -.004 -.005
(.015) (.014) (.014)
Other controls
Education - child husband excluded included included
Education -child wife excluded included included
Education -parents. excluded excluded included
Observations 739
Standard errors in parentheses. They allow for arbitrary correlation between obser-
vations belonging to the same dynasty. All models also include a second order polynomial
in the age of the oﬀspring of the donor and on the age of the in-law, separate dummies for
whether the donor is divorced, for widow and for widower, the number of grandchildren
of the donor, the number of grandchildren between 1 and 2 years of age and the number
of grandchildren of the donor between 3 and 5 years.
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    C
Y
Yex
 Figure 1 Allocation with Perfect Information and Preferences of the Child
C: consumption of the household of the child.
Y: earnings of the secondary earner.
Yex: earnings of the primary earner.54





 Figure 2 Optimal Transfer Schedule Under Imperfect Information
T0: Optimal transfer level if the secondary earner has low wage.
T1: Optimal transfer level if the secondary earner has a high wage.
C: consumption of the household of the child.
Y: earnings of the secondary earner.
Yex: earnings of the primary earner.55





 Figure 3 Response of transfers to variations in the income
of the primary earner (I)
Yex0: Initial earnings level of the primary earner.
Yex1: Final earnings level of the primary earner.
dT: Increase in transfers following a fall in income of the primary earner.56










Figure 4 Response of Transfers to Income of the Primary Earner (case 2)
Point A: Allocation of consumption and earnings of the child with income of secondary earner
Yv and income of the primary earner Yex0.
Point B: Allocation of consumption and earnings of the child with income of secondary earner Yv
and income of the primary earner Yex1.
Point C: Allocation of consumption and earnings of the child with income of secondary earner
Yv-1 and income of the primary earner Yex0.
U0: Utility indifference curve for an child with earnings of the
primary earner Yex0 and wage wv
U1: Utility indifference curve for an child with earnings of the
primary earner Yex1 and wage wv